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BY JAN KUDRNA*
Abstract. This article deals with the issue of responsibility for the actions of the President. The author distinguishes 
among three basic forms of responsibility of the Head of State – constitutional, constitutional political and criminal 
responsibility. In the aggregate, they form the complex responsibility of the President. Individual types of 
responsibility of the President are described in the article in terms of their theoretical basis as well as mutual 
relations. Their origin and development within individual Czechoslovak and Czech constitutional regulations are 
also described. The article analyses their constitutional regulation in the Constitution of the Czech Republic until 7 
March 2013, and particularly after this date when the full Constitutional Act No. 71/2013 Coll. came into effect. 
The Act signifi cantly infl uenced the responsibility for the actions of the President. In conclusion, the author duly 
focuses on evaluation of the current constitutional regulation, including considerations about possible de lege 
ferenda improvements.
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1. INTRODUCTION
The topic of responsibility for actions of the Head of State is a complicated one. Primarily, 
because it is this area of the law that involves a labyrinth of various forms of responsibility, 
which are interconnected. This issue is a topic of discussion in the Czech Republic, 
however, its present legal form has not been comprehensively analysed.1 The last 
amendment of the Constitution of the Czech Republic (hereinafter referred to as the 
“Constitution” and “CR”) was not only limited to a change in the method of the election of 
the President of the Republic (hereinafter referred to as the “President”) but also affected, 
signifi cantly, several aspects of their position in terms of the responsibility for performance 
of their duties. As will be demonstrated hereafter, this constitutional amendment brought 
the responsibility of the acts of the President back to the original starting point.
1 An exception in recent Czech professional literature is represented in an article by Prof. Jan 
Filip from 2010. It will form a methodical basis of our approach to this problem hereinbelow. See Jan 
Filip, ‘K ústavní odpovědnosti v ČR a odpovědnosti hlavy státu zejména za velezradu’ (2010) 1 
Časopis pro právní vědu a praxi 21–39. Or the respective passage by the same author in: Lenka 
Bahýľová et al., Ústava České republiky. Komentář (Linde 2010) 793–825.
*The author is a lecturer at the Department of Constitutional Law, Faculty of Law, Charles University 
in Prague, and a member of the Department of Legal Specialisations and Public Administration of 
Metropolitan University Prague and can be contacted via email kudrnaj@prf.cuni.cz. The article is 
published within the PRVOUK 04 Programme.
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2. DIFFERENT FORMS OF RESPONSIBILITY OF THE PRESIDENT 
OF THE REPUBLIC
In addition to the openness of public offi ces to all citizens and tenure of those offi ces for a 
limited period of time, basic features defi ning the system of government in a republic 
include accountability for performance of the offi ceholder’s duties. Yet the responsibility 
for performance of the offi ceholder’s duties is not a monolithic institute. On the contrary, it 
is a multi-layer complex of various forms of responsibility.
In his above-mentioned article,2 which is in many respects a necessary starting point 
for the description of this topic in Czech professional literature, Jan Filip3 distinguishes 
several forms of responsibility to be considered in respect of the President, or constitutional 
law in general. 
It is primarily the constitutional responsibility. Besides this, other forms of legal 
responsibility can be considered, particularly criminal responsibility.4 Professor Filip 
distinguishes between them and the constitutional political responsibility. A special – and in 
principle non-legal – type of responsibility is the political one. To a certain extent, it may 
but does not need to be connected with moral responsibility. 
The differentiation among the constitutional, constitutional political and political 
responsibility as presented in Professor Filip’s article is, in my opinion, particularly crucial 
and clarifi es the complexity of the different forms of responsibility of the President to such 
extent that I will apply it as the basis of this article.
Constitutional responsibility
As stated by Professor Filip, the existence of constitutional responsibility is based on the 
recognition of the existence of constitutional torts. These are actions of subjects of 
constitutional law which are in confl ict with the rules of constitutional law and which are 
directed against values protected by constitutional law.5 In the Czech constitutional system, 
an example of constitutional responsibility is the responsibility of the President for high 
treason. 
Constitutional responsibility requires special legal regulations. A prerequisite is 
regulation by constitutional law and its rules. This form of responsibility also concerns a 
special subject defi ned by constitutional law. Actions must be aimed against values protected 
by constitutional law. Also, the nature of sanctions corresponds to constitutional law.
Hence, constitutional responsibility is a specifi c type of legal responsibility and in 
many respects, it has a privileged character. It does not need to rule out other forms of 
responsibility of the subject concerned, on the contrary, it may supplement those forms.
2 Filip 21–39.
3 A professor at the Department of Constitutional Law and Political Science, Faculty of Law, 
Masaryk University in Brno, and currently a judge of the Constitutional Court of the CR.
4 Other forms of legal responsibility can also be considered, such as liability for offences and 
other administrative torts, civil liability, etc. With regard to the extensiveness of the problem and the 
limited scope of this text, we will not focus on all forms of legal responsibility.
5 Filip 24.
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Constitutional political responsibility
Constitutional political responsibility occurs where the confi dence in a relationship 
established by appointment or election is violated.6 Committing a tort, as required in the 
case of constitutional responsibility, is not necessary. This type of responsibility takes place 
in the case of violation of a political programme or assignment. The Constitution does not 
need to be violated. The responsibility can be borne both by an individual and by a group.7 
In contrast to constitutional responsibility, there is no giving of evidence or 
investigation. The subsequent proving of guilt is carried out in this case when drawing 
consequences. The withdrawal of confi dence and subsequent removal are preceded only by 
(political) discussion. 
Constitutional political responsibility is enforced by removal from offi ce. Although the 
two forms of responsibility mentioned thus far can supplement each other,8 it is not the case 
when the President of the CR is concerned. The President cannot be removed from their 
offi ce for political reasons. 
Therefore, the provisions of Article 54(3) of the Constitution stipulating that the 
President of the Republic is not responsible for the performance of their duties must be 
applied to this form of responsibility. 
Criminal responsibility
Criminal responsibility ranks among typical instruments of law. It is a case of drawing 
consequences from the infringement of values protected by criminal law. In relation to other 
forms of legal responsibility, it occurs in modern systems of law as ultima ratio. In this 
case, particularly a subject, subjective side, object and objective side of a tort must exist. 
Criminal responsibility is strictly individual, but there may be various forms of participation.
The application of this type of responsibility does not necessarily exclude application 
of other potential forms of responsibility of the President, especially constitutional 
responsibility. In this respect, the amendment of the Constitution of the CR was the most 
signifi cant change. While until 7 March 2013 concurrence of constitutional responsibility 
and criminal responsibility was excluded as the President was equipped with a very 
extensive criminal immunity of substantive nature, after this date the concurrence of both 
types of responsibility has been possible. This change also affects Article 54(3) of the 
Constitution as it slightly narrows its meaning. 
Political and moral responsibility
In addition to the clear legal types of responsibility (the constitutional and criminal 
responsibility mentioned herein) or the responsibility established and regulated by law but 
still having a political nature (the constitutional political responsibility), non-legal types of 
responsibility clearly exist. In the fi eld defi ned by constitutional law this is primarily the 
political responsibility, or the moral responsibility as the case may be. 
6 ibid 24 and 27.
7 This is the case of the government of the CR; on the contrary, the individual constitutional 
political responsibility of an individual member of the government is impossible in the CR. For 
example, in Poland, this form of responsibility does exist in relation to the government both in the 
joint and individual form.
8 As is the case e.g. in the neighbouring Austria or Slovakia.
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As mentioned by Professor Filip, even though constitutional law does allow for them, 
they defy the principles of the rule of law as they do not necessarily rely, e.g., on 
presumption of innocence, proof of guilt, etc.9 The proving of guilt is not necessary but, 
despite this, a mere expression of suspicion or accusation is not enough. Political 
responsibility is a basic part of the rules of conduct, due to which the political system can 
function.
Moral responsibility may occur in the event of a breach of required rules of society, 
not necessarily in direct connection with the performance of the political offi ceholder’s 
duties. It may be a violation of those rules in the private life of the politician concerned.
Political responsibility to voters or colleagues is enforced in the form of resignation 
from one’s offi ce; likewise in the case of moral responsibility. Voluntary resignation may 
often only be relative, because staying in offi ce despite the pressure of public opinion can 
result in holding the offi ce, but at the same time in the political disabling of its holder.10
Both these types of non-legal responsibility also relate to the President. Due to their 
non-legal nature, their application obviously cannot exclude a legal rule.11 Therefore, I will 
deal with them below with regard to the obvious possibility of their application.
3. OUTLINE OF THE HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF RESPONSIBILITY 
OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA
1918 Interim Constitution
The fi rst constitutional document in the independent Czechoslovak Republic which made 
provisions for an individual Head of State was the Interim Constitution, i.e. Act No. 37/1918 
Coll. of Laws and Decrees. This regulation was of considerably provisional character, 
which was also obvious from the merely general character of the regulation concerning the 
position of the President and their responsibility for performance of their duties.
It is not clear from the Interim Constitution that the President had any constitutional 
responsibility. No provisions were made for the possible sanctions of a constitutional tort.
On the contrary, as can be seen from the last sentence of § 10 of the Interim 
Constitution, the President did not bear constitutional political responsibility. Each 
governmental act of the President had to be countersigned by the respective responsible 
9 Filip 27.
10 As an example of such political disabling, we can refer to the case of the former US senator 
Edward M. Kennedy, as mentioned, e.g., by the Polish publicist M. Ziomecki. When he was a young 
senator, Kennedy caused a traffi c accident in which a woman travelling with him died. He did not try 
to save her and failed to summon assistance, on the contrary, he left the scene of the accident. For this 
crime he was given a suspended prison sentence. As he was a talented and popular politician, he was 
repeatedly re-elected to the Senate of the US Congress until his death, for seven six-year terms of 
offi ce in total. Nevertheless, whenever he tried to test the potential options to gain his party’s 
nomination as a presidential candidate, people dressed in wetsuits appeared at his meetings and 
receptions and thus every attempt ended there. It was therefore tolerable for a person who had failed 
in a fraught life situation to participate in the work of the Senate, but it was unacceptable to entrust 
him with the individual responsibility for managing the country. For details on the issue of political 
and moral responsibility, see: Mariusz Ziomecki, ‘Obciach i szacun’ (2013) 18 Przekrój (3536) 15.
11 If we disregard the highly improbable possibility to rule out possible abdication of the 
President of the Republic.
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member of the government. By this countersignature the constitutional political 
responsibility was passed from the President to the government. Confi dence in the 
government, not in an individual minister, could be withdrawn if need be.
From among the other legal forms of responsibility, only the Interim Constitution 
provides for criminal responsibility. Within its § 9, it rules out criminal prosecution of the 
President for the term of their offi ce.
It is evident that a concept of excluded constitutional political and criminal 
responsibility of the Head of State had started taking shape from the very beginning of the 
Czechoslovak constitutional development.
1920 Constitutional Charter
The concept of responsibility for the performance of duties of the President in the 1920 
Constitutional Charter12 is based on the Interim Constitution. To start with it does not 
establish the constitutional responsibility of the Head of State. Thus it does not make 
provisions for an option to prosecute the President for a constitutional tort, or to possibly 
remove them. 
The President did not bear constitutional political responsibility. Within its § 66, the 
Constitutional Charter stipulates that the government is responsible for all statements of the 
President related to their offi ce, and in § 68 it outlines the mandatory countersignature of 
each President’s act of governmental and executive powers by a responsible member of the 
government.
The Constitutional Charter makes exclusive provisions for the criminal responsibility 
of the President of the Czech Republic in the case of high treason. Proceedings were to be 
held before the Senate upon the motion of the Chamber of Deputies. For details, the 
Constitutional Charter referred to another special law implementing it.
As evident from the above, we encounter a mixed solution of distinguishing between 
the constitutional and criminal responsibility of the President as used herein. The 
Constitutional Charter talks about criminal liability but uses the term high treason, which is 
today connected with constitutional political responsibility in the Czech Republic. Also, the 
proceedings where the plaintiff is one chamber of the Parliament and the judicial authority 
is the other chamber rather corresponds to impeachment.
In fact, § 67 of the Constitutional Charter provides for the issue of criminal 
responsibility of the President; it only makes provisions for privilegium fori, i.e. a special 
body authorised to fi le impeachment charges and conduct judicial proceedings relating to a 
tort of the President.
This is demonstrated by the fact that the respective implementing law, only adopted on 
21 February 1934 and published as the Act on Criminal Prosecution of the President and 
Members of the Government under No. 36/1934 Coll. of Laws and Decrees, does not 
address high treason at all. The facts of high treason were actually established in § 58 of 
Criminal Law No. 117/1852 of the Code of the Empire. Thus, in § 67 the Constitutional 
Charter refers to the Criminal Code and the tort provided for therein. 
Eventually, the Constitutional Charter was in fact indirectly amended by Act No. 
50/1923 Coll. of Laws and Decrees, for the Protection of the Republic, which expressly 
cancelled the above-mentioned § 58 of the Criminal Code and replaced it with the provisions 
12 Published under No. 121/1920 Coll. of Laws and Decrees. Available online in English at: 
http://archive.org/stream/cu31924014118222#page/n1/mode/2up [cit. 05/02/2015].
44 JAN KUDRNA
of its § 1–3. They replaced high treason with crimes in aggregate called “plots against the 
republic” and comprising plots, preparation for plots and threats to the republic.
This means that they were crimes equal to some of  today’s crimes against the republic 
as contained in the Criminal Code. At the time of the 1st Czechoslovak Republic, high 
treason had a different meaning than today. It is also important that the Constitutional 
Charter did not know the constitutional responsibility of the Head of State.
Ninth-of-May Constitution
As concerns responsibility for acts of the President, the Ninth-of-May Constitution approved 
Constitutional Act No. 150/1948 Coll. adopting the substantial features of the previous 
constitutional regulations. It also did not know the constitutional responsibility of the 
President. In respect of the constitutional political responsibility, it fully assumed the 
solution adopted by the 1920 Constitutional Charter as it proclaimed the President was not 
responsible for performance of their duties and shifted all responsibility to the government 
by means of countersignature. 
Regulation of the President’s criminal responsibility underwent a certain change. 
Again, the Ninth-of-May Constitution only permitted criminal prosecution of the President 
for high treason. However, notwithstanding the previous constitutional regulations, it 
stipulated that the punishment could only be a loss of offi ce and the eligibility to regain it.13 
At this moment, elements of the constitutional and criminal responsibility of the 
President overlapped in the Czechoslovak constitutional development. While the President 
could be indicted for committing specifi c yet criminal acts, the punishment could only be a 
sanction of considerably constitutional nature. Here, we can see a real shift that will lead us 
to the present situation, where high treason is embodied as a constitutional tort and all of its 
aspects are separated from the possible criminal responsibility of the President.
The Ninth-of-May Constitution referred to a law again in detail. Until 6 October 1948 
this was Act No. 50/1923 Coll. of Laws and Decrees, for the Protection of the Republic. On 
the mentioned date, it was replaced with Act No. 231/1948 Coll., for the Protection of the 
Democratic People’s Republic. Act No. 36/1934 Coll. of Laws and Decrees, on Criminal 
Prosecution of the President and Members of the Government was nullifi ed by the 
Constitution itself. Due to these changes, there was no defi nition of the body of high treason 
after 6 October 1948. It is quite another thing that in the given historical situation it was no 
longer a current matter.
1960 Constitution
In respect of responsibility for acts of the President, the new Constitution passed on 11 July 
1960 and published as Constitutional Act No. 100/1960 Coll. meant, a breakthrough as it 
formally adopted a brand new approach to these issues; despite this apparent breakthrough 
it did not in fact change anything. 
Its key provision is Article 61(2) stipulating that the President is responsible for the 
performance of their duties to the National Assembly. This meant abandoning the principle 
13 In reaction to the cancellation of the Senate and introduction of a single-chamber National 
Assembly, the Ninth-of-May Constitution also changed the procedure of high-treason proceedings, as 
it stipulated that the impeachment charges were to be fi led by the presidium of the National Assembly 
and trial was to be held by the National Assembly.
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applied since 1918 in Czechoslovakia, according to which the Head of State has no 
responsibility.
Nevertheless, the said provision is as concise as it is inapplicable. Neither in the 
provision, nor anywhere else does the Constitution stipulate the consequences of the 
responsibility and the procedure of enforcement of responsibility.
In general terms, the said formulation is the basis for potential constitutional as well as 
constitutional political responsibility. The government did not assume responsibility for the 
exercise of presidential powers.
The issue of criminal responsibility of the Head of State is clearer. The 1960 
Constitution did not bestow the President with immunity. They were formally fully 
criminally liable for their actions, throughout the duration of their term in offi ce. Even in 
this case, the criminal responsibility also covers those actions which are, e.g., currently 
classifi ed under special constitutional responsibility.
Constitutional Act No. 143/1968 Coll.
In terms of highly formal proclamation the 1960 Constitution was a mere episode in the 
Czechoslovak constitutional development. Eight years later, it was totally amended by the 
Constitutional Law of the Czechoslovak Federation published under No. 143/1968 Coll. 
The position of the President and responsibility for their actions was also changed.
The construction of the President’s responsibility for exercising their duties to the 
Federal Assembly was maintained. The provision of Article 60(2) of the said constitutional 
act remains as short as in the amended Constitution, and there are still no implementing 
regulations. The question of how the responsibility would be enforced remains unanswered 
at the normative level. Twenty years later we can only theoretically conclude that the 
President could probably be removed from their offi ce by the Parliament. Nevertheless, 
some authors caution that no such procedure is embodied.14
The described constitutional act opens the door to both the constitutional and 
constitutional political responsibility of the President for their actions. Moreover, it also 
suggests the regulation of criminal immunity of the President defi nes their criminal 
responsibility. 
Under Article 65 of the Constitutional Act on Czechoslovak Federation, the President 
cannot be prosecuted for actions related to the performance of their duties. Two conclusions 
can be drawn from that formulation. First, formally speaking, the President could be 
prosecuted even during the term of their offi ce for all crimes of a “non-offi cial” nature. 
Second, the said provision meant that crimes of an “offi cial” nature were subject to 
responsibility towards the Federal Assembly. In other words, the President’s responsibility 
to the Parliament also contained the element of constitutional responsibility.
The said constitutional situation continued until the Czechoslovak Constitution ceased 
to exist and the Constitution of the independent Czech Republic was adopted.
Responsibility for acts of the President of the Czech Republic until 7 March 2013
In respect of the regulation of responsibility for acts of the President, the Constitution 
prepared for the independent Czech Republic was infl uenced by several factors. 
First, it was prepared under the premise that it was to be the real fundamental law of 
the state. It no longer had to be a façade legal rule of a more or less declaratory nature, 
14 Stanislav Zdobinský et al., Československé státní právo (Prague 1988) 148–149.
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because the political operation is managed without the aid of the Constitution. On the 
contrary, in the environment of plural democracy where no single political centre of power 
exists, political confl icts will be resolved using legal rules.
Second, it was the previous constitutional development. Authors of the Constitution 
built particularly upon the 1920 Constitutional Charter, but the subsequent constitutions 
also had some infl uence. Some forms of responsibility of the President were adopted from 
the previous constitutions, others were expressly rejected, and in some respects individual 
solutions overlapped.
And fi nally, constitution-makers were infl uenced by the basic idea that the legal 
framework of the Head of State’s (non-)responsibility should at the same time serve as an 
expression of respect to the state itself, the offi ce of the President and the person holding 
the offi ce.15
As a result of the above-mentioned facts, the selected solution was to provide the 
President with strong protection against responsibility for their actions ,16 the selected 
concept built upon the development of the past 75 years and distinguished among different 
forms of responsibility additionally the set rules were not of a proclamation nature.
Constitutional responsibility
In respect of the constitutional responsibility of the President, the draft Constitution itself 
underwent some development. According to the original draft of the government,17 the 
President was to only be responsible for high treason. Responsibility for this tort was to be 
established in criminal proceedings, where the Chamber of Deputies was authorised to fi le 
impeachment charges and the proceedings were to be held before the Constitutional Court. 
The only sanction was to be the loss of offi ce, or the eligibility to be re-elected into offi ce 
as the case may be.
As evidenced above, the proposers of the Constitution originally adopted the concept 
and formulation from the 1920 Constitutional Charter. The proceedings were to have a 
criminal nature, privilegium fori was to be maintained but the sanction, in contrast to the 
fi rst-republic model, was to be of a purely constitutional nature. In the case of the sanction, 
we can see the infl uence of the constitutional development of the 1948–1992 period.
The proposed concept was rather complicated, as can be determined from the 
explanatory memorandum.18 High treason was approached as a tort of criminal law but not 
15 See Filip 28. Similarly the Constitutional Court of the Czech and Slovak Federative Republic 
published under resolution No. 7/1992 Coll. of Judgments and Resolutions: “In view of the fact that 
our system of law does not give a clear answer to what all contents of the President’s offi ce description 
are, it is necessary in cases of doubt to interpret the President’s actions so that they are made by the 
President in the position of the Head of State. The public objectively sees the President as the Head of 
State and the President alone has a greater political as well as moral responsibility and in view of that 
fact must be provided with greater protection.”
16 In connection with the very generously approached protection of the President of the Republic 
against criminal responsibility, Professor Filip says that it allows the President to freely do anything, 
if necessary, to save the state, its unity and democratic foundations without having to consider whether 
they can, fi guratively speaking, “enter the crossroads against a red light” – ibid 32.
17 Print of the Czech National Council No. 152 in the seventh term of offi ce. Available online: 
http://www.psp.cz/eknih/1992cnr/tisky/t0152_01.htm [cit. 05/02/2015].
18 It stated that: “[The President] [m]ay only be prosecuted for high treason, the body of which 
is not defi ned by the Criminal Code as it particularly concerns political decisions. Otherwise, it would 
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contained in the Criminal Code, tried according to the criminal procedure but on the basis 
of impeachment by a special body and before a special tribunal, where the result of the 
proceedings could be the imposition of a sanction other than of criminal nature. The fact 
that the draft of the Constitution failed to defi ne the body of high treason did not contribute 
to its clarity either. For those reasons, the whole concept was changed when the draft was 
discussed in the Czech National Council.
The change was made by fi ling a comprehensive proposed amendment19 stipulating 
that the President could be prosecuted before the Constitutional Court on the basis of 
impeachment charges of the Senate for high treason. The only sanction could be the loss of 
the presidential offi ce and the eligibility to regain it.
This proposal, eventually approved as a part of the Constitution of the CR, completed 
the previous constitutional development and introduced the institution of constitutional 
responsibility of the President into the Czech constitutional system.
A relatively serious defect of the Constitution, which was not removed until the 
amendment of the Constitution introducing direct election of the President, was the missing 
defi nition of the body of high treason. As pointed out by Professor Filip in his article,20 the 
rule of law requires the bodies of crimes to be clearly defi ned. 
It should be noted that the bodies should be defi ned at the level where the position of 
the organ itself is determined, as the defi nition of its responsibility is one of its basic 
determining factors. In the case of the President, it is, in addition, a part of the relationship 
to other constitutional organs and thereby a part of the system of separation of powers. 
These are purely constitutional matters and they should not be subject to redefi nition by 
ordinary laws.
Eventually, the body of high treason was included in § 96 of Act No. 182/1993 Coll., 
on the Constitutional Court. High treason meant actions of the President aimed against the 
sovereignty and integrity of the republic as well as against its democratic order.
Actions directed against selected constitutional values were identifi ed as high treason 
establishing the constitutional responsibility of the President. Those values are particularly 
important characteristics of the existence of an independent state on the territory 
corresponding to the approved Constitution of the state, and of its political regime.21 The 
question of what degree of danger, or what intensity the possible high-treason actions of the 
President must have shall be fi rst assessed by the submitter of the impeachment charges, 
and defi nitively by the Constitutional Court. It may be especially unclear when assessing 
what action of the President constitutes a threat to the democratic order of the republic.22
be necessary to not only apply only the Criminal Code, but also the Code of Criminal Procedure. 
Such proceeding would have to be conducted before court and the Chamber of Deputies could not be 
authorised to fi le impeachment charges. Loss of the presidential offi ce as a punishment is not 
contained in the Criminal Code either.”
19  Print of the Czech National Council No. 154 in the seventh term of offi ce. Available online: 
http://www.psp.cz/eknih/1992cnr/tisky/t0154_01.htm [cit. 05/02/2015].
20  Filip 30.
21  For a detailed explanation of these values, see ibid 30.
22  It became apparent in the case of the amnesty of the President of the Republic proclaimed on 
1 January 2013 and the subsequent dismissal of impeachment charges for high treason, which stated 
the proclamation of the amnesty in the given form as one of the reasons of accomplishment of 
elements of a constitutional tort. Although on 10 September 2009, in its resolution fi le No. III. ÚS 
431/09, the Constitutional Court held that “[un]punishment of perpetrators of serious property, 
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The construction of the constitutional tort of high treason contained other weaknesses. 
First, constitutional values included in the body of high treason can also be infringed by 
actions for which the responsibility is assumed by another constitutional organ. In other 
words, a question is raised as to whether the President can commit high treason in exercising 
the powers under Article 63 of the Constitution, or those under Article 62 of the Constitution, 
which require cooperation of another constitutional organ.
Evaluation of such a case is complicated. Responsibility for an act of the President 
passes to the organ which participates in the exercise of their power. Nevertheless, it is 
necessary to emphasise that such an organ (e.g. the government in exercising the powers 
under Article 63 of the Constitution) only assumes the constitutional political responsibility. 
Not the constitutional one. 
It is therefore conceivable that a situation might arise in which the President and the 
government commonly infringe one of the constitutionally protected values and the 
President bears the constitutional responsibility and the government bears the constitutional 
political responsibility, and its members possibly additionally bear the criminal 
responsibility.23 At the time of validity of the 1920 Constitutional Charter, a similar 
conclusion was reached by Dr. Emil Sobota.24 This conclusion also corresponds to the 
theoretical construction according to which shared powers are exercised by a single organ 
comprising of two, as also mentioned by Professor Weyr.25
 As evidenced above, the construction of responsibility for acts of the President 
thoroughly combines constitutional, constitutional political and criminal responsibility. There 
may be situations where an action of one offi cial will lead to a different type of responsibility 
as compared to that of the identical action of an offi cial acting jointly with the fi rst.
Another complicated situation emerges where the selected presidential powers are 
delegated under Article 66 of the Constitution because the President is unable to perform 
their duties, or the offi ce of the President is vacated.
In this case, constitutional responsibility for the exercise of those powers does not pass 
to the constitutional offi cials. Where their exercise of delegated powers infringes any of the 
constitutionally protected values, which would mean, in the case of the President, acts of 
elements which would amount to high treason, they will bear no more than the constitutional 
political responsibility and criminal responsibility.
This conclusion is based on the fact that the constitutional responsibility of the 
President has been established because the President is not politically responsible for the 
performance of their duties and cannot be criminally punished for the performance. This is 
not the case for the serving constitutional offi cials. As they can bear constitutional political 
responsibility as well as criminal responsibility there is no reason why they should be 
fi nancial and economic criminality with reference to unconstitutional delays in criminal proceedings 
might lead to a general weakening of citizens’ confi dence in democratic rule of law”, it did not take 
this argument into account in the proceedings on the impeachment charges for high treason, resolution 
fi le No. Pl. ÚS 17/13.
23 Constitutional political responsibility of the President is excluded by Article 54(3) of the 
Constitution; their criminal responsibility was excluded by the original wording of Article 65(1) of the 
Constitution. On the contrary, the constitutional responsibility of the government has not been 
established at all.
24 Emil Sobota et al., Československý president republiky. Státoprávní instituce a její život 
(Prague 1934) 98.
25 Frantisek Weyr, Ústavní právo Československé (Prague 1937) 191.
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punished alternatively, as the enforcement of constitutional responsibility is an alternative 
punishment.26 
Another open question at the time of adoption of the Constitution was whether 
constitutional responsibility was tied to the person holding the offi ce of the President or 
whether it was connected strictly with the performance of duties of the President. In other 
words, can a former President be tried for high treason after termination of their offi ce.
The very construction of constitutional responsibility of the President leads to the 
conclusion that the responsibility can be enforced even after termination of the offi ce. Is the 
tort of high treason anything else but an alternative tool of enforcement of responsibility for 
the grossest infringement of constitutionally protected values against a President who bears 
no constitutional political and criminal responsibility? As stated by Professor Filip, high 
treason has changed from an original tool of protection of a sovereign into a tool of 
protection of the state against the actions of its head.27 For this reason, it is correct to try 
unconstitutional actions of a former President. The fact that reasons for possible 
impeachment charges were discovered only after termination of their term of offi ce should 
not be an obstacle. On the contrary, in some cases, it cannot be otherwise. 
This consideration is supported by impending sanctions. It is not only the loss of 
offi ce, but also the loss of the eligibility to be re-elected to offi ce. As it is the only sanction 
threatening the President, who bears no other responsibility, it is not possible to renounce it. 
Not to mention that the termination of presidential offi ce should certainly not be an obstacle 
to initiation of proceedings before the Constitutional Court, which is the only way of 
assessing the actions of the former President that might seem, for documented reasons, to 
grossly infringe fundamental constitutional values.
Nevertheless, in its judgment Pl. ÚS 17/13,28 pronounced on 27 March 2013, the 
Constitutional Court took an opposite stance in this respect. It supported the conclusion that 
if in doubt, it was necessary to give preference to the more favourable interpretation for the 
defendant. Therefore, it refused to try the impeachment charges. The Constitutional Court 
thereby actually restricted the already narrowly defi ned constitutional responsibility of the 
President. Another thing is that the said judgment has practically no signifi cance for the 
future, as will be shown hereafter.
Constitutional political responsibility 
Constitutional political responsibility is a tool of control over an appointed or elected organ 
or offi cial by the one who appointed or elected them into offi ce. Responsibility is not only 
established for possible violation of legal regulations, even though it is not impossible, but 
particularly for the loss of confi dence in the exercise of the duties inherent in the offi ce. The 
reason for the establishment of constitutional political responsibility is primarily the loss of 
political confi dence in the actions of the respective offi cial or organ.29 Hence, it is the 
responsibility established by legal regulations, but also having an inherently political nature.
26 Similarly Filip 29.
27 ibid 29.
28 Available online in English: http://www.usoud.cz/en/decisions/?tx_ttnews[tt_news]=2345&c
Hash=a6e71152c31c6aea5845bd9d4fe5218e [cit. 05/02/2015].
29 As Professor Filip states, this loss of confi dence is not ascertained by means of investigation 
and providing evidence, but by political discussion and a subsequent vote on (no-)confi dence (Filip 
27).
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A typical example of constitutional political responsibility in parliamentary systems is 
the responsibility of the government to the Parliament or one of its chambers. This is the 
solution also adopted by the Constitution of the CR. Concerning the position of the 
President, the authors of the Constitution diverged from this variant. The authors of the 
Constitution did not use the mechanism introduced by the 1960 Constitution, according to 
which the President had been responsible to the National Assembly, or Federal Assembly. 
Rather it was interpreted, as the case may be, and, as deduced by theory, responsibility had 
been probably enforced by removal of the President by the Parliament.30 On the contrary, 
the authors of the Constitution accepted the concept of the 1920 Constitutional Charter. For 
one thing, they stipulated in Article 54(3) of the Constitution that the President was not 
responsible for the performance of their duties, and further they did not embody any 
mechanism for removal of the President for constitutional political reasons. Nevertheless, 
they did not completely guarantee the transfer of this type of responsibility to another organ.
Thereby, this provision may come into confl ict with one of the fundamental principles 
on which the Constitution of the CR is built, i.e. the principles of republicanism. It 
determines the type of government system and, hence, it is superior to any possible rules 
determining the form of government within the system of government, or even modifi cation 
of the form of government. 
There are two fundamental rules in a republic. According to the fi rst, every citizen may 
run for public offi ce. At the same time, according to the second rule, every public offi cial is 
responsible for the performance of their duties in contrast to monarchies. Therefore, a 
situation where the Head of State would be equipped with powers, yet bear no responsibility 
for exercising them, would be in confl ict with the principles of a republic.31
This problem can only be resolved by systematic interpretation, or more precisely, 
when we talk about the creation of a constitutional text, then incorporation of such tools 
that enable the transfer of constitutional political responsibility from the President, who is 
not supposed to be burdened by it, to another organ.
Although in 1992 constitution-makers were repeatedly referring to the model of the 
1920 Constitutional Charter, they did not strictly use its concept as a base. While the 
constitutional regulation of the First Czechoslovak Republic expected full countersignature, 
as every “act of the governmental and executive powers” had to be countersigned, the 
Constitution of the CR is only based on partial countersignature and introduces a number of 
powers of the President not shared with the government. The result is a hybrid model 
combining two previous arrangements.32
In reality the President gained an even more independent position in relation to the 
government. This position of the President was thanks to the provision of Article 63(3) of 
the Constitution. Pursuant to this provision, only the exercise of power in the form of 
decisions is subject to countersignature. 
30 For details, see footnote 13.
31 For details see e.g. Jan Kudrna ‘The Question of Conducting Direct Elections of the President 
in the Czech Republic (A Live Issue for 20 Years Already)’ (2011) 18/4 Jurisprudencija (Jurisprudence) 
1299. Available online: https://www3.mruni.eu/ojs/jurisprudence/article/download/1682/1592 [cit. 
05/02/2015].
32 For details see e.g. Jan Kudrna ‘Záplatování jako nevyhnutelná základní metoda přístupu k 
Ústavě ČRʼ in Gerloch A. Kysela et al. (eds), 20 let Ústavy České republiky: ohlédnutí zpět a pohled 
vpřed (Vydavatelství a nakladatelství Aleš Čeněk 2013) 84–101.
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Relatively soon after the adoption of the Constitution of the CR, the Constitutional 
Court had to address this issue. In its judgment fi le No. Pl. ÚS 43/93,33 the Constitutional 
Court particularly explained what the term “decision” meant. According to the Constitutional 
Court, “it is such exercise of power which changes or confi rms a legal situation (even those 
of individual persons)”. The Constitutional Court emphasised that the “[d]ecision rendered 
cannot be, therefore, understood as any ‘decision toʼ act in a certain way.”
Thereby, the Constitutional Court confi rmed that the government’s ability to infl uence 
the way the President acts was even narrower than it might have seemed at fi rst glance. For 
example, in regard to powers related to foreign policy of the state as defi ned in Article 63(1)
(a) and (b), there is a relatively large space for the independent activities of the President, 
which are not subject to the Prime Minister’s countersignature. 
A signifi cant lack of equilibrium may arise in this area between the viewpoints of the 
President and those of the government. 
The imbalance can only be overcome by systematic interpretation. The President 
cannot be deprived of those powers and their contents cannot be denied as the text of the 
Constitution is clear in this respect. Alternatively, the government cannot be denied the 
option to exercise the countersignature as a tool of expressing its political viewpoint.34 
Harmony can only be achieved if the President preliminarily discusses their planned 
political steps in representation of the state and negotiation of international treaties with the 
government so that both parties can avoid a collision for which the Czech Republic would 
pay a high political external price. This means exercising powers of the President as well as 
the government in mutual accord and on the basis of mutual self-restrictions.35
The principle of self-restriction and cooperation, even though in various degrees of 
intensity, can be applied to decision-making under all countersigned powers of the President. 
After all, it already follows from the above-described construction by Professor Weyr, 
according to which shared powers are exercised by a single new organ comprising of two.36 
Where there are two organs required to exercise a power, they must fi nd agreement. It will 
often take the form of a compromise, where the organ assuming overall responsibility for 
the decision certainly has the right to exercise its infl uence. 
It is possible from the formal constitutional point of view that the government fails to 
exercise the political aspect of countersignature and makes use only of its legal aspect. This 
may, however, result in a situation where the government would abandon its constitutional 
political control role in relation to the President, giving considerable independence to the 
President and, at the same time, it would bear full constitutional political responsibility. 
33 Published under No. 91/1994 Coll.
34 In this context it should be noted that the legal opinion of the government expressed by the 
Prime Minister, Minister of Justice and Chairman of the Government Legislative Council on 9 January 
2013, and repeatedly over the subsequent days, that the countersignature does not have a political but 
only a legal content is unfounded, particularly with regard to the constitutional development of the 
institute of countersignature. It would result in a situation where the President of the Republic would 
be completely free in their actions without bearing constitutional political responsibility for said acts. 
The institute of countersignature is a tool for ensuring the alternative enforcement of constitutional 
political responsibility of an offi cial who does not bear responsibility in this respect.
35 For details see e.g. Kudrna ‘The Question of Conducting Direct Elections of the President in 
the Czech Republic’  1299–1300. Available online: https://www3.mruni.eu/ojs/jurisprudence/article/
download/1682/1592 [cit. 05/02/2015].
36 See footnote 24.
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In respect to the constitutional political (non-)responsibility of the President, the 
situation is further complicated by the fact that within the Czech Republic the 
countersignature is effected by the Prime Minister or a member of the government 
authorised by them. Consequently, the control over exercise of presidential powers primarily 
lies in the hands of the Prime Minister, not the government as such. This can also be 
considered a weakening of the government’s control function, particularly compared to the 
pre-war situation. The countersignature was then carried out by the responsible member of 
the government under § 68 of the 1920 Constitutional Charter. The position of a minister in 
relation to the government is weaker than that of the Prime Minister. Although not 
impossible, it is easier for the government to bind its individual members than the Prime 
Minister, especially when they are equipped with the power to propose removal of members 
of their government.
The constitutional regulation directly embodies a situation where the Prime Minister 
countersigns, but the responsibility is borne by the whole government, although the 
government does not in fact need to be informed in advance about the subject of 
responsibility that it will assume.37 Ideally, the Prime Minister can inform their government 
and act according to its resolution. Such a procedure would also be more appropriate as 
members of the government would not be confronted with a fait accompli. Nevertheless, 
the Prime Minister is not obliged to follow this procedure. Consequently, a situation may 
occur where members of the government can only express their possible disagreement with 
countersignature ex post, in an extreme case in the form of resignation.
In conclusion, the authors of the Constitution of the CR fully absolved the President 
from constitutional political responsibility and, in addition, they strengthened this organ by 
releasing many of their powers from the control of other constitutional organs. This 
damaged, to a considerable extent, the concept of the parliamentary organisation in which 
the President was institutionally limited.
Criminal responsibility
The authors of the Constitution of the CR drafted the criminal responsibility of the President 
very generously. In fact, they completely ruled out any criminal prosecution of the President, 
whether within judicial or administrative punishment. Within Article 65 the Constitution 
distinguishes between two categories of torts according to the criterions of their type and 
from the moment that they are committed. 
First, the Constitution ruled out the possibility to detain and prosecute the President 
during the term of their offi ce. This immunity covered all crimes, offences or other 
administrative torts. Given the formulation of the Constitution, it is an obstacle to 
prosecution for all mentioned types of torts which the President would commit before 
assuming the offi ce or, where offences and torts are concerned, also during the term of their 
offi ce.
In regard to crimes possibly committed by the President during the term of their offi ce, 
the Constitution laid down special regulations embodying a very wide substantive immunity. 
Within the provision of Article 65(3), prosecution of the President for those crimes was 
wholly excluded.
In this way, the President was made immune from prosecution for the term of their 
offi ce and their criminal responsibility for torts committed during the term of their offi ce 
37 As was allegedly the case of the amnesty of 1 January 2013.
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was expressly ruled out. It should be pointed out that the Constitution ruled out criminal 
responsibility of the President in relation to all crimes, not only those of an “offi cial” nature. 
The criterion was the time of their committing, not their nature. 
Criminal non-liability applied only to the President, not constitutional offi cials acting 
on their behalf if required. In addition, no one assumed criminal responsibility for the 
President with regard to the individual approach to culpability in modern criminal law.
Responsibility for acts of the President of the Czech Republic from 8 March 2013
Although when discussing the direct election of the President it was often heard that it 
should only occur for a change of the Head of State, but everything else was to remain 
unchanged, ultimately the result was different. The amendment of the Constitution carried 
out by Constitutional Act No. 71/2012 Coll. had greater implications. The amendment 
rather considerably changed inter alia the constitutional regulation of responsibility for acts 
of the President. While the constitutional political responsibility remained unchanged, the 
constitutional and criminal responsibility was subject to quite considerable changes.
Constitutional responsibility
The framework defi ning constitutional responsibility of the President underwent the most 
noticeable changes in connection with the introduction of the direct election of the Head 
of State. 
First, the last reminiscences of high treason, originally an institute of criminal law, as 
adopted by the constitutional regulation of the inter-war Czechoslovak Republic from 
Austrian criminal law, were removed. The loss of the presidential offi ce and the eligibility 
to be re-elected to offi ce is no longer considered a “punishment” in Article 65(2) of the 
Constitution. In the explanatory memorandum,38 the proposer directly draws attention to the 
difference between criminal and constitutional sanctions and justifi es the change of 
formulation of the above-mentioned provision as an effort to avoid problems with 
interpretation. 
This change can only be appreciated when differentiating amongst the different forms 
of responsibility that may be considered in the case of the President, and which, as 
repeatedly shown above, often overlapped in the previous regulations.
Another fundamental and predominantly positive change is the defi nition of the 
constitutional tort of high treason in the Constitution. The previous situation where only the 
law defi ned what is meant by a term embodied in the Constitution, but was still crucial for 
the defi nition of the position of the President, was extremely undesirable. Elements of the 
body of high treason remained unchanged.
Nevertheless, the constitutional responsibility of the President was strengthened as in 
addition to high treason, the President also bore constitutional responsibility for “gross 
violation of the Constitution or another part of the constitutional order”. The Constitution 
of the CR ranked among the many constitutions that are protected against violation by the 
Head of State. This change is positive.
38 Parliamentary print No. 415 in the sixth term of offi ce. Available online: http://www.psp.cz/
sqw/text/tiskt.sqw?O=6&CT=415&CT1=0 [cit. 05/02/2015].
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However, it raises a fundamental question. The question is whether it is suitable to 
distinguish among violations of constitutional regulations by intensity. Is it acceptable for 
the sanction to only apply to “gross” violations of constitutionality and not to “light” – 
deduced a contrario – ones? This regulation probably refl ects the effort to protect the 
President against prosecution for petty or controversial issues. Hence, the constitution-
makers keep approaching the Head of State with a higher level of respect, which they wish 
to maintain.39 Yet distinguishing of this type is not appropriate. It implies that some 
violations of constitutionality are not torts and, therefore, they are in fact acceptable.
The most signifi cant change which, to a considerable extent, made provisions on the 
constitutional responsibility of the President almost obsolete, affected the procedure of 
fi ling a constitutional action. The existing regulation was signifi cantly toughened. Recently, 
approval of both chambers by constitutional majority is required and, in addition, approval 
of the Chamber of Deputies must be granted within three months from the date when the 
Senate asks for it. If the Chamber of Deputies fails to do so, the approval is considered not 
granted. 
In the explanatory memorandum, the proposer states that the aim of this enforcement 
is to create “an adequate safeguard against unjustifi ed proposals which would, in the end, 
damage the whole of the Czech Republic, and to emphasise the extraordinariness of the 
institute of impeachment”.
This argument is relevant to a certain extent, but it is not crucial. The main argument 
for toughening the procedure, which the proposer, however, does not mention, should be 
the effort to protect the directly elected President against potential calculated attempts of 
the Parliament, or one of its chambers, to remove them. 
Unjustifi ed proposals which might damage the Czech Republic certainly cannot be 
excluded, but as shown by the example of the proceedings of high treason up until the 
beginning of 2013, even within the rather turbulent social atmosphere, it was not easy to 
gain the required support in the Senate, which was defi nitely not favourable to the then 
President. In any case, one can agree with the proposer that the procedure was in need of 
reform in order to make the submission of unjustifi ed proposals more diffi cult, but the 
reasons given for this change should have been different.
Nevertheless, one cannot agree with making the proposal conditional upon the support 
of constitutional majorities in both chambers of the Parliament, moreover intensifi ed by a 
lapse period. The set rules are strict to such extent that except for the most fl agrant cases of 
high treason, they virtually exclude the possibility to prosecute the President. In the end, the 
procedural rules effectively form an obstacle to prosecution and thereby make the 
constitutional responsibility of the President an almost academic matter. It would be 
suffi cient to lay down a condition of approval for fi ling the action by three fi fths of the 
present senators.
One procedural specifi cation was made at the level of laws, as a provision was added 
to § 98(3) of the Act on the Constitutional Court stipulating that prosecution of the President 
was not infl uenced by the fact that their offi ce had terminated by expiration of their term of 
offi ce. Once this provision took effect, resolution of the Constitutional Court fi le No. Pl. ÚS 
39 The question is why this should be the case. Undisturbed operation of other organs is more 
important for regular functioning of the state but no respect of that sort is shown to those organs. 
Moreover, while it is typical for monarchies built on exclusiveness that they are reinforced by trust 
and respect, quite the opposite is true in republics. Republics are strengthened by an equal approach; 
privileges, on the contrary, cause their delegitimisation and erosion.
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17/13 became irrelevant for the future. This change, however, has no infl uence on the fact 
that prosecution can be initiated only against an acting President. This conclusion follows 
from the wording of the Constitution and the Act on the Constitutional Court. 
Criminal responsibility
As of 8 March 2013 the rules relating not only to the fi eld of criminal responsibility for acts 
of the President and the existing approach to this type of responsibility of the Head of State 
underwent drastic reforms resulting in near revolutionary reactions. 
The change was caused by the complete deletion of the regulation contained in the 
original Article 65(3) of the Constitution. It had established absolute substantive immunity 
in the case of any crime committed by the President during their term of offi ce. Thereby, 
Professor Filip’s consideration that the President is granted wide protection in the 
circumstance where it would be necessary for them to violate the legal order in the interest 
of saving the state and its system of government, ceased to be justifi ed.40 Criminal 
prosecution of the directly elected President for torts committed during the term of their 
offi ce is possible.41 
In the fi eld of criminal responsibility, only the procedural immunity of the President 
established by Article 65(1) of the Constitution was maintained. Not even after 8 March 
2013 can the President be detained or prosecuted for a crime, offence or other administrative 
tort. This procedural obstacle to prosecution only lasts for the term of offi ce of the President. 
It means that after termination of their offi ce the obstacle to criminal prosecution ceases to 
exist and the former President can be prosecuted in the standard way. 
It is worth remembering that as long as the immunity as a statutory obstacle lasts 
within the meaning of § 10(1) and § 11(1)(c) of the Code of Criminal Procedure,42 limitation 
periods are interrupted under § 34(3)(a) of the Criminal Code.43 As concerns criminal 
prosecution, termination of the offi ce of the President means that all obstacles cease to exist 
and full equality before the law is re-established. 
The situation is more complicated in the case of offences. § 20(1) of the Act on 
Offences44 would be applicable, stipulating that no offence can be heard after expiration of 
one year from it being committed. With this type of tort, it would, in principle, depend on 
how long before the termination of their offi ce the President committed the offence.45
40 See Filip 32.
41 A specifi c breakthrough in this respect occurred as early as on 1 October 2009 when the 
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court became binding on the Czech Republic. In its 
Article 27, it prohibits taking any offi cial capacity into consideration when evaluating criminal 
responsibility for acts to be tried by the Court under the Statute, and in the provision of paragraph 2, it 
expressly stipulates that no immunities under national law will be taken into account.
42 Act No. 141/1961 Coll., on Criminal Judicial Proceedings, as amended.
43 Act No. 40/2009 Coll., the Criminal Code, as amended.
44 Act No. 200/1990 Coll., on Offences, as amended.
45 In this respect, I disagree with the opinion of Professor Filip who refers to Section 9 of the 
Act on Offenses and deduces that hearing a potential offence committed by the President is absolutely 
excluded. See Filip  36. I hold the opinion that Article 65(1) of the Constitution provides protection 
against prosecution to the President, but not a former one. At the same time, this provision is the 
“law” to which the aforementioned Section 9(1) of the Act on Offences refers. However, it provides 
procedural protection, not a substantive one, and therefore it is impossible to rule out a situation 
where the obstacle to hearing an offence ceases to exist.
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The Constitution generally puts obstacles upon hearing of other administrative torts 
during the term of the presidential offi ce. However, the Constitution does not equip the 
former President with any protection against hearing of the torts after termination of their 
offi ce.
The effects of the change in the fi eld of the criminal responsibility for the actions of 
the President constitute a shift from one extreme to another. While the President was 
previously equipped with an unusually extensive criminal immunity for any acts committed 
during the term of their offi ce, the new regulation adopted the opposite solution. The 
President is only protected during the term of their offi ce and once it terminates, they are no 
longer protected at all.
I believe that the current solution is not an appropriate one. In terms of criminal 
responsibility at least, any kind of immunity from prosecution for statements of the 
President should be maintained. In addition, in my opinion it would be worth considering 
distinguishing between torts committed by the President in the performance of their duties 
and other torts. Whereas, in relation to other torts there is no reason why the President 
could not be prosecuted after termination of their offi ce, in the case of the “offi cial” torts I 
am of the opinion that they should at least be partially subject to the constitutional 
responsibility and not the criminal element. After all, a large part of them will accomplish 
the elements of gross violation of constitutional regulations.
4. CONCLUSION
The issue of responsibility for acts of the President is not a simple one. Its complexity is 
caused by the special position of an individual Head of State from whom, despite the 
fundamental principles of the republic, something more is expected than the mere fulfi lment 
of specifi c offi cial duties. Within Czech society these expectations are traditionally even 
greater.46 From one angle these expectations are evident in the fact that the offi ce of the 
President was maintained without interruption, even during the period of the democratic 
people’s regime, while all similar states preferred, at least for some time, collective bodies 
as leaders of the countries’ constitutional systems. Another aspect is that these considerable 
and even excessive expectations manifested themselves in the rather controversial 
embodying of the position of the President in the currently valid Constitution. According to 
one perspective the authors of the Constitution declared their effort to establish a 
parliamentary form of government, but conversely, they “freed” the President from the 
infl uence of other constitutional organs in an unusual form. This internal ambiguity also 
became evident in the concept of (non-)responsibility for acts of the President. 
A failure to clarify differences among various forms of responsibility, which might be 
considered by constitutional law in the case of supreme offi cials, played its part as well. 
Individual institutes overlap in many respects, which certainly does not contribute to the 
clarity and comprehensibility of the whole system of responsibility.
The last amendment of the Constitution meant a rather signifi cant shift in the described 
fi eld that will infl uence the overall position of the President. The fact that from the 
substantive point of view the constitutional responsibility of the President was extended, 
and in the fi eld of criminal law the President was entirely deprived of substantive immunity, 
46 See the above-mentioned resolution of the Constitutional Court of the Czech and Slovak 
Federative Republic No. 7/1992 Coll. of Judgments and Resolutions.
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will certainly have some effect. The President has become responsible to a greater extent, 
which means at least a partial removal of the basic confl ict described at the beginning of 
this text. It is the confl ict between the principle of republicanism, the immanent part of 
which is the necessity to account for the performance of duties connected with the assigned 
offi ce on the basis of the principle of equality, and the principle of non-responsibility of the 
President of the Czech Republic, or the limited responsibility as the case may be. 
This confl ict could only be resolved by the requirement for constraint and self-
restriction of the President in the performance of their duties in order to avoid a situation 
where they should be responsible for their political actions, but the responsibility would be 
excluded. The more the President, or any other constitutional offi cial, is directly responsible 
for their actions, the freer their actions can be. 
In the case of the President, this means that they can be more active in comparison to 
the situation before 7 March 2013, and to the extent to which their responsibility was 
strengthened. This, however, weakens their role as a “representative of the state, guarantor 
of the order and moderator of political disputes,” which is “not intended for the realisation 
of their own policy”.47 Independence and freedom are always connected with responsibility. 
At present, the responsibility of the President of the Czech Republic is greater than before. 
Although the approach to responsibility of the President shifted in a desirable direction, 
the shift also includes many critical points. The extension of the constitutional responsibility 
of the President and strengthening of their criminal responsibility can be assessed as 
positive. On the contrary, the critical fl aw is the setting of procedural rules which will more 
likely make the enforcement of constitutional responsibility impossible rather than possible. 
A considerable weakness is the approach to criminal responsibility, where the constitution-
makers should have unambiguously distinguished the different types of crimes that might 
be committed by the Head of State during the term of their offi ce. The opportunity to 
address critical loopholes in the fi eld of constitutional political responsibility for acts of the 
President was completely missed.
On the whole, it can be stated that the current regulation of responsibility for the 
actions of the President has many weak points. This may be caused by the fact that the issue 
was not primarily addressed as a constitutional problem. 
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